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1. Introduction

In this part, we introduce Monero’s original signature scheme as described in van Saberhagen’s seminal Cryptonote paper [2]. The scheme is an adaptation of the Traceable Ring Signature introduced by Fujisaki and Suzuki [1]. The most recent version of Monero implements a different signature known as RingCT. It modifies the original scheme to accomodate confidential transactions. We will discuss it in detail in parts 7, 8 and 9.

Security analysis of ring schemes consisted primarily in proving a) correctness, b) resilience against EFACM attacks in the RO model (unforgeability), and c) anonymity (i.e., signer ambiguity according to e.g., definition # 1 or # 2 as previously described in part 3). However, none of these security metrics tells if 2 signatures were generated by the same user or not. Doing so does not necessarily break the anonymity of the signer, but rather establishes a relationship between pairs of signatures. Identifying whether 2 signatures are linked or not is essential when dealing with electronic cash for example. In this case, the network must not tolerate the double spending of the same unit of electronic currency on 2 different transactions. In an electronic cash setting, the message typically consists of an unspent transaction output (also known as UTXO) and the objective is to make sure that the owner of a UTXO does not sign it twice (i.e., double spend it). Whenever this happens, the incident must be flagged and proper measures taken.

Monero in particular, and cryptocurrencies in general are prone to the double spending problem. This motivates the need to have an additional security requirement to tell if 2 signatures were issued by the same user. This must be done without releasing the identity of the user. We refer to the new requirement as linkability. It can commonly be achieved by adding to the ring signature a new signer-specific component known as a tag or a key-image.

Formally, we define a linkable ring signature scheme as a set of 4 algorithms:

  • The signer’s key generation algorithm \mathcal{G} (as described in part 1)
  • The ring signing algorithm \Sigma (as described in part 1).
  • The ring verification algorithm \mathcal{V} (as described in part 1)
  • The ring linkability algorithm \mathcal{L}. Its input consists of a set of tags (key-images) and a given signature \sigma. It checks if \sigma‘s tag is included in the tag set. If so, it outputs Linked. Otherwise, it outputs Independent and adds the new tag to the set.

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